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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the end of the Cold War, culture has made a dramatic return to the
international stage. The predictions are that its presence will be even more widely felt
in the new millennium, as it fans old conflicts or perhaps even gains new powers of
persuasion, capable of displacing military coercion as a political tool. Culture has
already had a hand in a wide range of developments: in the responses to dislocations
brought on by global economic forces, in the goals and strategies of both new and old
actors in the global arena, and in unprecedented connections among individuals
around the planet. To analyze these circumstances may take radical new thinking
about individuals, societies, and even nature.
One may ask: Where to begin? Culture and identity are broad and complex concepts;
even scholars have tended to shy away from them. The term “culture” itself is
problematic, for it still has a strong association with archaic attitudes about
“primitive” groups, especially the sense of superiority associated with colonialism.
In its broadest sense, “culture” refers to the set of beliefs and values held in common
by a group of people, reflected in their shared habits of communicating and
interacting. “Identity” refers to the unit to which an individual belongs. It can take
various forms: the unit can be all of humanity, a particular civilization, a specific
nation, an ethnic group, a province, or portions thereof. In fact, individuals possess
an array of identities—concentric circles, as it were, each representing a different
sphere. The first circle would be the unique characteristics of the person; the second,
the immediate family; the third, extended kin; and so on, through occupation,
political affiliation, nationality, and religion. Identity therefore refers not to specific
physical attributes but to one’s relation to the environment in which one lives, and
to all therein. That is why scholars tend to regard identity as “relational”: it exists by
virtue of the various relations individuals and groups have with one another, with
surrounding entities, and with the natural environment.
Adding complexity, countless other spheres transect these concentric relational
spheres, crossing so many boundaries that they are often said to be “international” in
character. They include governmental organizations, businesses, labor, professional
and scientific associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), immigrant
populations, and diasporas, to name the most obvious. Even within the borders of a
single country, identities intersect in many ways. A simple example is ethnic or racial
allegiances that may cut across occupation or political affiliation.
The question that has long intrigued scholars—whether culture plays a significant
role in shaping human behavior or whether “natural instincts” are the controlling
factors—has often arisen in discussions of the evolution of communities from tribes
through empires to modern states. Were these units of human association shaped by
terrain, climate, the presence of competing communities; or by ideas people had
about who they were and the common objectives that bound them together? In more
and more fields, ranging from neuroscience to the humanities, the old either-or view
 For a lucid overview of culture as “the
newest fad sweeping the literature on
international relations, security studies,
and international economics,” see
Michael J. Mazarr, “Culture and
International Relations: A Review
Essay,” Washington Quarterly :
(Spring ), pp. –; the quotation
is on p. . Other prime examples are
William Zimmerman and Harold K.
Jacobson, eds., Behavior, Culture, and
Conflict in World Politics (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, );
Yosef Y. Lapid and Friedrich
Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Culture
and Identity to IR Theory (Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, ); and
Special Issue, Culture in International
Relations, Millennium : (Winter
).
 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order (New York: Simon and Schuster,
); and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to
Lead: The Changing Nature of American
Power (New York: Basic Books, ).
 Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld
(New York: Ballantine Books, ).
“There is a need for new ways of
perceiving the world, for a new
paradigm of social change. The nation-
state is primarily a way of imagining the
world, and its institutions.… That it was
such a powerful model is proved by the
difficulty of imagining what comes after
it.” Matthew Horsman and Andrew
Marshall, After the Nation-State
(London: HarperCollins, ), p. ,
quoted in Roger Tooze, “Prologue:
States, Nationalism and Identities-
Thinking in IR Theory,” in Identities in
International Relations, Jill Krause and
Neil Renwick, eds. (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, ), pp. xvi.
 See Krause and Renwick, eds., Identities
in International Relations; and Ronnie
Lipschutz, ed., On Security (New York:
Columbia University Press, ).
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of nature and culture is giving way to one that sees something of both at the heart of
human behavior. Neuroscientists are finding that behavior guided by cultural ideas
affects the physiology of the brain, while humanists are discovering physiological links
to virtually all forms of cultural expression.
Perhaps the truth lies close to the original meaning of the word “culture.” The term
stems from the Latin verb colere, to till. Cultivation was an expression of the basic
relationship between human groups and the natural environment from which they
derived their sustenance. Culture thus came to signify basic ways in which different
societies viewed their relation to nature—not only as a source of food and energy,
but also as a source of experience that would help them deal with mortality and mark
the milestones of the human life cycle.
In the social sciences, a fundamental question about culture is how it is connected
to rationality. Those economists and other social scientists inspired by economic
methods would argue that the attitudes and beliefs shared by groups are calculated
responses to their environment, including nature and other human collectives with
which they interact. By contrast, more sociologically oriented social scientists see
these beliefs as imaginative inventions that cannot be understood as calculated
responses to incentives without learning the meanings cultures have for people.
The growing consensus is that the social sciences need to better understand how
actors, both individuals and collectives, acquire the interests they pursue. This is a
highly complex question, especially as actors change and new ones emerge. And even
if one were to determine the extent to which identities may change and culture may
shape their interests, one would then have to determine how public policy or private
initiatives, in turn, affect identity and interest.
The task here is to assess how culture and identity affect security. This cannot be
done, however, without defining the precise identities that can have such an impact,
and the manner in which their cultures are thought to affect human behavior. It is
also essential to examine the decisions being made to regulate or respond to the
cultures that stimulate cooperation or conflict.
 See Bryan Wilson, ed., Rationality
(Evanston, Ill.: Harper & Row, ).
Also Jan Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the
Social Sciences (New York: Cambridge
University Press, ).
 See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of
International Politics (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley, ). Rational choice
and game theoretic perspectives have
elucidated the ways in which self-
interested states respond rationally to
an environment of other self-interested
actors, on issues ranging from nuclear
deterrence to economic regimes.
 On the meanings actors attach to
their behavior, see Clifford Geertz,
The Interpretation of Cultures (New
York: Basic Books, ); and Peter
Winch, The Idea of a Social Science
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
). Ethnographic research that seeks
to uncover the ways actors think about
their own behavior is potentially
subjective and difficult to generalize.
Despite the methodological controversies
about what constitutes good social
science, much well-regarded policy
analysis does draw conclusions about
states of mind. In practice, research is
rather eclectic.
 Barry Weingast, “A Rational Choice
Perspective on the Role of Ideas—
Shared Belief Systems and State
Sovereignty in International Cooper-
ation,” Politics & Society : (December
), pp. –; Judith Goldstein and
Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and
Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, ); Albert Yee,
“The Causal Effect of Ideas on Foreign
Policy,” International Organization :
(Winter ), pp. –; Daniel
Phillpott, “The Possibilities of Ideas,”
book review, Security Studies :
(Summer ).
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I.  THE SECURITY RATIONALE
The first point concerns who is pursuing security, and why. In most cases, especially
in the context of policy analysis, it is the state. Precisely which states are the key
players is normally easy to determine. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
rash of identity-related wars in the s, however, the identity of states and other
actors has changed considerably, and this factor, plus the reason for the change, must
be taken into immediate account in related policy matters. The violent assertion of
ethnic identities, and the resulting international pandemonium, is a major reason for
the renewed attention to identity in the security context. That is why analysts have
again turned their attention toward understanding what makes social groups cohere
and dissolve.
Whether the fluidity of political identity in the aftermath of the Cold War is a
temporary or transitional phenomenon, it is widely believed that the nation is not a
fixed unit with definite origins in the ancient past. In fact, most nations are relatively
recent creations, many of them brought into being by an inventive elite that imagined
or assumed a common past and culture in order to forge a common identity out of a
diverse populace. Even France, often seen as the quintessential nation, had, around
, a sizable population that did not speak French or identify with others who lived
on the territory of the French state.
Although the plasticity of national and ethnic identities remains a controversial issue,
it has acquired a new relevance with the integration and disintegration of established
identities that can no longer be taken for granted. Among the products of integration
are the European Union and regional trading blocs such as the North America Free
Trade Association (NAFTA), while the splintered entities include the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, and other units emerging from regional autonomy movements, such as
the Northern League in Italy, that challenge the cohesion of well-established nations.
In addition, many domestic political regimes are experiencing fundamental changes
in the global push toward democracy and economic liberalism. Even where countries
are not joining others or falling apart, many are changing their political and economic
institutions, thus altering the basic features of their public culture.
At the same time, the twentieth century has witnessed spectacular growth in the
number of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, transnational
businesses, and other cross-border associations, which has been accompanied by a
general increase in the capacity for global communication. These developments,
along with the end of the Cold War, suggest that still more new identities lurk on the
horizon and that they are likely to have an enormous impact on the future course of
international relations. Indeed, the very ways in which identities are shaped and
maintained may be undergoing a profound transformation. On the other hand, some
suggest that identities are reverting to earlier forms that were attenuated during the
Cold War.
 See, for example, Lars-Erik Cederman,
Emergent Actors in World Politics: How
States and Nations Develop and Dissolve
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, ).
 See Eugen Weber, Peasants into
Frenchmen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, ).
 Evan Luard, International Society (New
York: New Amsterdam Books, );
Harold Jacobson, Networks of Interde-
pendence: International Organizations
and the Global Political System (New
York: Knopf, ).
 On the growth of transnational civil
society, see Ronnie Lipschutz,
“Reconstructing World Politics: The
Emergence of Global Civil Society,”
Millennium : (Winter ), pp. –
; and Paul Wapner, “Politics Beyond
the State: Environmental Activism and
World Civic Politics,” World Politics
: (April ), pp. –. On
emerging forms of transnational
identity, see James R. Rosenau, Along
the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring
Governance in a Turbulent World (New
York: Cambridge University Press,
).
 See Huntington, The Clash of
Civilizations; Robert Kaplan, The Ends
of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the
st Century (New York: Random
House, ); and Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in
International Politics (New York: Oxford
University Press, ).
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In matters of security, say some observers, the emphasis on the state during the
Cold War appears to have diverted attention from the well-being and security of
individuals. Instead, there is a single-minded focus on the foreign dangers that states
are supposed to protect against. These observers would like to see cooperation rather
than conflict become the salient concern of national security bureaucracies, fearing
that, in their search for enemies, nations will blindly pick someone to fit the role
rather than clarify priorities. The underlying assumption here is that the processes
behind identity formation do not automatically create bad relations, but that policy-
makers have considerable choice in shaping viable security identities. Some would
counter: “We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only
when we know whom we are against.”
If security identities, however, are not dictated by the threats and dangers of the
international milieu, important choices can clearly be made. This has already been
amply demonstrated by both the range of security issues and theoretical perspectives
under current debate, following the emergence of important new actors. A search
has also begun for a better understanding of the ways in which social, economic, and
environmental processes impinge on security. In the wake of this conceptual ferment
and the resulting policy innovations of the past decade, a strong push has developed
for a more precise formulation of America’s role in the post-Cold War era, whether
this role is viewed in terms of hard interests, or values. The objective is, in effect, to
gain a clearer sense of America’s identity in the new global context. But the degree of
choice any actor has in forging its own identity is difficult to determine, especially if
it is a complex actor such as the United States, whose identity and impact on global
security are not limited to the federal government and what it does. Furthermore, the
awareness of newly available choices has brought to light normative issues about what
priorities should be pursued and what kinds of identities should be preserved and
promoted.
A second point is that culture and identity can play an important role even when
identities are relatively stable and their boundaries fairly well established, since
“security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors.” That is, the
cultures they possess and profess, internally and among one another, may affect the
ways in which they define and pursue their goals. Hence, even in stable
circumstances, cultures provide a repertoire of attitudes and responses based on the
beliefs and habits that prevail in a country or that have been established among
countries in their mutual relations. To what extent norms and ideas can be used to
explain particular outcomes remains a matter of lively debate. Nonetheless, culture
remains an important candidate for explaining how the interests of actors are formed.
The interests of a newly independent country will obviously differ from those it had
when it was a colony struggling for independence. But there are also less sweeping
transformations when culture affects interests. Even when the physical makeup of a
state— the population and territory that compose it—have not changed, it is
possible for prevailing attitudes to change. Furthermore, states, nations, and other
actors may employ important changes in culture when engaging in their regular
interactions. Whether these changes originate internally, abroad, or through some
combination of both, cultural changes may affect the ways a populace and its
leadership act and the way others interact with them.
 For a range of novel perspectives, see
Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas,
eds., World Security: Challenges for a
New Century (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, ).
 See Barry Buzan, People, States, and
Fear: The Problem of National Security in
International Affairs (London: Wheatsheaf
Books, ).
 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations,
p. .
 For recent reviews of the literature, see
Ann M. Florini and P. J. Simmons, The
New Security Thinking: A Review of the
North American Literature (New York:
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, ).
 Ethics are often said to be irrelevant for
international affairs, especially in the
security realm, because there is little
freedom of choice when it comes to
responding to threats that endanger
one’s survival. This is the Realist position,
which maintains that the international
realm is one in which necessity dominates,
severely constricting, if not altogether
eliminating, the freedom needed to
make moral choices. For a recent
anthology, see David R. Mapel and
Terry Nardin, eds., International Society:
Diverse Ethical Perspectives (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, ).
 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction:
Alternative Perspectives on National
Security,” in The Culture of National
Security: Norms and Identity in World
Politics, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. (New
York: Columbia University Press, ),
p. .
 See Paul R. Abramson and Ronald
Inglehart, Value Change in Global
Perspective (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, ).
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Suppose that the identity-based ferment of the post-Cold War era is indeed a
historical anomaly and that people will eventually settle into fixed identities.
The possibility remains that the ways in which actors employ their cultures to
communicate and interact will greatly influence the course of global affairs. These
might be the cultures associated with the great religious traditions or, more
narrowly, those that prevail in foreign policy bureaucracies, military organizations,
civil society, or even in the family. Cultures are widely thought to affect behavior and
the reactions that behavior is likely to elicit from others. The military cultures in the
armed forces of a state, say, may influence the state’s choice of a strategic doctrine.
And a culture that relies heavily on familial ties at the expense of building commercial
allegiances with strangers may fail to forge the widely based social trust needed to
foster a vigorous civil society and sustain long-term economic growth.
Also, cultures perceived to be less receptive to democratic forms of government may
affect a group’s response to international economic and political trends. There is
evidence to suggest that transnational cultural norms de-legitimize weapons of mass
destruction, increase respect for human rights, and discourage racial discrimination.
Furthermore, the exchange of cultural ideas can lead to mutual learning and the
discovery of alternative ways of conceiving both one’s own identity and the identities
of other actors, which leads full circle to the question of whether repeated cultural
interactions give rise to new identities.
Yet a third point to consider is the effect of culture and identity on conflict and
cooperation. Cultural differences, whether among civilizations or ethnic groups, are
said to either cause or exacerbate conflict, although some would say these differences
do not carry as much weight as the international distribution of power, the nature of
political institutions, or other socioeconomic factors. And despite the continuing
controversy over the effectiveness of cultural communication and interaction, many
policy-makers and activists have long been using these factors to try to prevent and
resolve conflicts. That controversy revolves in large part around whether the benefits
of fostering cultures of cooperation will eventually be dwarfed by inherently
incompatible interests and identities that are bound to cause violent conflict,
regardless of cultural changes.
Since security is closely tied to assumptions about culture and identity, the next
questions concern the identities of key actors and their attributes: What role does
culture play in shaping the interests of actors? And how can culture be used to alter
behavior? The purpose in exploring these questions here is not necessarily to
determine what is known about these issues in themselves but to relate that
information to security issues.
These questions will be examined in the context of the three main points covered in
this section concerning the relevance of culture and identity to security. In the next
section, the consequential actors in the context of world security are considered. Here
it is necessary to look at the basic views about what makes states, nations, and other
collective actors cohere and act as units. The third section focuses on culture’s effects
on the interests or motivations of key actors; therefore it is concerned with particular
trends and conclusions, including conflicting ones, that relate to political institutions,
military doctrines, policy decisions, and other factors governing the role of culture.
The last section turns to the more specific issue of how culture may either cause or
arrest conflict, and its usefulness as an operational tool.
 Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and French
Military Doctrine Before World War
II,” in The Culture of National Security,
Katzenstein, ed., pp. –.
 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social
Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity
(New York: Free Press, ).
 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds.,
The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic
Study (Boston: Little Brown, ).
 Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons
Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, ); Margaret Keck and
Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Across Borders
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
); Audie Klotz, Norms in
International Relations: The Struggle
against Apartheid (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, ).
 For a recent statement, see the Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict:
Final Report (Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Commission on Preventing
Deadly Conflict, ).
 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations.
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II .  ACTOR IDENTITIES
Although space does not permit a philosophical discussion of the ultimate units of
reality, these units should at least be mentioned because identities do not simply
“exist,” presenting themselves in a self-evident manner, ready for tabulation and
cross-referencing. Identities are rooted in broader conceptions or theories. Social
scientists would say that identities, like all facts, derive from theories that explain why
only some of the innumerable events that take place should be treated as facts. These
are not necessarily scientific theories; even in everyday life people use theories that are
implicit and only partly articulated, if at all.
Of course, impatience with “theory” is common in the realm of policy and activist
responses to immediate problems. Yet broader conceptual and theoretical issues seem
unavoidable, if only because of identity. Even in pragmatic policy debates, unsettled
identities lead to questions about the appropriateness of paradigms, quests for “new
thinking,” and reappraisals of causal relations previously taken for granted. This has
certainly been the case since the end of the Cold War, a period in which an established
adversary has transformed itself, the United States armed forces are struggling with
“asymmetrical” responses from actors who do not fit the profile of a professionally
organized armed force, and security analysts are concerned about the potential
proliferation of actors who might imperil the information networks on which both
civilian and military infrastructures increasingly depend. Even in this narrower context,
the “who” or “what” behind these dangers needs to be examined for its capabilities,
its intentions (or animating mechanism), and the range of possible responses.
In short, identities are not simply “out there.” Because they describe the most basic
elements of what the world “out there” is made of, identities cannot be explained
without understanding other basic aspects of how the world works. Consequently,
when thoughts about identity first surface, they do not simply relate to a new
problem or issue, but to some of the fundamental ways in which one has habitually
framed not only problems of policy but also one’s own thoughts. Though policy
analysts are wise to avoid endless debates about unearthing the foundations of
knowledge and reality, it is important to emphasize that, for better or worse, thinking
about identity inevitably draws people in that direction.
Fortunately, there are guides to help one avoid the quagmire of “ultimate reality,”
with its uncertainties about what questions should be asked. One such guide
condenses the varieties of thinking about identities into three basic conceptions
of identity: constructivism, instrumentalism, and primordialism.
In the constructivist perspective, an identity is a shared set of ever-changing meanings
or cultures relating to togetherness that are continually made and remade in the
public sphere. Although there may be periods when shared meanings are stable,
people continually maintain and alter collectively created myths of togetherness.
This view treats with skepticism any explanation or policy that assumes cultures do
 This typology taken from Paul C. Stern,
“Why Do People Sacrifice for Their
Nations,” in New Perspectives on
Nationalism and War, John L.
Comarroff and Paul C. Stern, eds.
(Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, ).
Stern used his typology to organize
perspectives on nations and nationalism.
Here it is employed to include other
forms of identity.
 See Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin
and Spread of Nationalism (London:
Verso, ); and Eric Hobsbawm and
Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of
Tradition (New York: Cambridge
University Press, ).
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not change or that cultures are simply ideological tools used by elites to manipulate
the masses.
From the instrumentalist perspective, cultures are symbolic tools of the powerful
elements of society. These elites are said to manipulate images, symbols, and words of
togetherness in order to mobilize the masses for military conscription, war, a larger
pool of wage labor, or for other purposes that serve their particular interests. However
plastic identities may be, instrumentalists argue, their prime importance lies in the
way they can be exploited by powerful elites. Hence cultures and identities are simply
instruments of power.
In the primordialist view, certain identities tend to be particularly robust and highly
stable over long periods of time. Nationalism and ethnicity fall into this category.
Elites may engage in vigorous propaganda to exploit symbolic power, but their efforts
are thwarted by deep and ancient loyalties, which can only be manipulated at the
margin. In response to the constructivist, then, the primordialist would say that, yes,
ancient symbols can be modified and new ways of communicating can emerge but
only as a veneer over established ties of blood and affection, which remain unaltered.
Constructivist thinking is apparent in the argument that newly independent Third
World states seek modern weapons not to meet defense needs but to attain the status
of a full-fledged nation-state, inasmuch as such weapons are now an accepted mark of
that status in international society. The thesis is that these states acquire missiles and
advanced jet fighters because they are important symbols of statehood that are
recognized as such in the international system. Through such signals, the club of
states tells newly independent states how to win the same regard accorded other
states.
The constructivist sees identities and the interests they pursue emerging from
a complex interplay of communication and interaction. In contrast, the
instrumentalist assumes that actors already have innate interests, such as power
or wealth. These interests are pursued by using identity as a symbolic resource.
Napoleon, for one, relied on the spirit of nationalism to create the French nation
and man his army; in much the same way, Milosevic mobilized ethnic hatred to
seize and secure power in Serbia. A primordialist might counter that their ancient
culture encourages Serbs to be fierce fighters, so they are not likely to respond to
military-diplomatic threats or promises, as some other less bellicose cultures
would. This is because, for the primordialist, core qualities in cultural identities
are difficult if not impossible to alter.
In most cases, of course, all three views of the role of identity in social life can be
invoked to account for particular circumstances. As the constructivist points out,
culture is highly significant. The beliefs and ideas people hold and exchange are the
seedbed of the goals actors value and strive to achieve. The processes used to
communicate these beliefs help explain how identities form and are maintained; the
identities, in turn, account for the interests actors pursue. Thus the likelihood of
cooperation or conflict depends on how actors think of themselves and those with
whom they interact. Although instrumentalists do not see culture as the driving force
of social life, they do think it legitimizes political and economic arrangements,
bolsters social cohesion through its ideologies, and provides useful rules of thumb for
 See Barry R. Posen,“Nationalism, the
Mass Army, and Military Power,”
International Security : (Fall ),
pp. –. See also Stephen Van Evera,
“Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,”
International Security : (Spring ),
pp. –. For a general functionalist
account of how nationalism emerges to
serve the integrative needs of a modern
industrial society, see Ernest Gellner,
Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, ).
 See Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism:
A Quest for Understanding (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, ).
 Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman,
“Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of
Conventional Weapons: An Institutional
Theory Approach,” in The Culture of
National Security, Katzenstein, ed.,
pp. –.
 For a general argument, with case
studies, on the ways in which the
international context helps shape the
identities of states, see Martha
Finnemore, National Interests and
International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, ).
 See V. P. Gagnon, “Ethnic Nationalism
and International Conflict: The Case of
Serbia,” International Security :
(Winter /), pp. –.
 See, for example, Richard Cohen,
“Send in the Troops,” Washington Post
(November , ), p. A.
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cognitively complex situations. Nevertheless, culture is not at the heart of human
behavior; rather, other socioeconomic or political factors are, and culture is a
consequence of them. Furthermore, cultures do not form interests; cultures follow
from the pursuit of interests. Conflict and cooperation are the result of those interests
and the strategic calculations made in pursuing them.
At times, however, there may also be some substance to the primordialist argument:
whatever their origins, cultures may have features that have become so deeply
entrenched in the ways individual personalities are formed, that talk of change is
not very meaningful within one lifetime. Cultures do unite and divide humanity.
Significant cultural change may be a thing of the past, and it may actually be affected
by biology and genetic difference. Whatever the reasons for the remarkable
consistency of core identities, say the primordialists, change occurs at a glacial pace,
belying the appearances of today’s world, saturated as it is with rapidly changing
symbols and messages. Thus, primordialists find that culture limits what is achievable
through political and economic means. Culture, they conclude, is not a tool for
change, but it does indicate where the deepest differences lie and thus where conflict
is more likely.
Where these several views converge and often collide is on the identity of the key
actors in international affairs, usually, states and nations. In reviewing the important
trends in thinking about the behavior of these actors, the emphasis in this discussion
naturally falls on the constructivist approach, not because it is superior but because
it is the one that relates the features of actors most closely to culture. Constructivist
explanations, it should be mentioned, are a relatively recent arrival to the field of
international relations, though they have longer standing in anthropology, sociology,
and the humanities.
NATIONS AND THEIR RELATIONS
In a prescient essay of , Isaiah Berlin remarked that nationalism is the one great
social force neglected by the two dominant social theories of the past century.
Neither the liberal tradition going back to John Locke, Adam Smith, and John Stuart
Mill, nor the socialist tradition most prominently associated with Marx paid much
attention to the lasting emotional and psychological power of the nation. For all these
thinkers, nationalism was an archaic way of providing the glue for society, bound to
be replaced by more rational principles of organization as societies modernized. The
two world wars and the rash of ethnic and nationalist conflicts of the decade since
 have shown all too well that nationalism cannot yet be relegated to the dustbin
of history.
Both constructivists and instrumentalists agree that nations emerged as important
identities only about two hundred years ago. In the constructivist view, however, the
key factor influencing international relations was not states and state-based elites but
the interplay between the visions of the nation crafted not only by state-based actors
but also by actors from society at large. Of course, primordialists would argue that
existing collective identities and the visceral loyalties they represented preceded the
emergence of the state as a legal capsule for the nation. The state simply served to
formalize and legalize allegiances that were already there.
 See William Bloom, Personal Identity,
National Identity and International
Relations (New York: Cambridge
University Press, ).
 Isaiah Berlin, “The Bent Twig: A Note
on Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs
(October ), pp. –.
 This observation has recently been echoed
by David Callahan in Unwinnable Wars:
American Power and Ethnic Conflict
(New York: Hill and Wang, ),
pp. –.
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By and large, however, most analysts have assumed that each nation should be
considered as an identity separate from others. In spite of comparative studies of
nationalism, the kind of relational emphasis Berlin suggested was not common.
Berlin held the view, recently echoed by other scholars, that nationalism is rooted in
dignity: it denotes a relation among peoples who want their collective identities to be
recognized and respected by others. The growing emphasis on this relational aspect
of nationalism is not so surprising when one looks at the recent reconstitution of new
states along nationalist lines and the influence of the global context on the current
ferment over identity. Hence scholars are paying more and more attention to the
role of cultural interactions in forming nations instead of the internal dynamics of a
circumscribed people and territory. Since their studies tend to be concerned with
exchanged meanings, they see cultural communication and interaction as an
independent force with considerably more influence on the formation of nations
than other socioeconomic pressures or a primordial identity.
Whatever basic assumptions are adopted in analyzing national identity and its
significance, the consensus seems to be that the state is an important institution.
Whether the state came into being as a result of a nation’s desire to rule itself,
whether it used or even created the culture of the nation to legitimate its rule, or
whether more complex processes combining the state, civil society, and the
international system gave rise to the cultural complex called the nation, it is difficult
to find nations mentioned without states. Though nations are often thought to
provide the cultural content of the nation-state, states have also been said to be
carriers of a distinctive culture.
STATES AND SOVEREIGNTY
Although the primordialists would say otherwise, most other scholars agree that
states preceded and played an important role in the formation of modern nations.
The state is the administrative, legislative, and adjudicative entity that exercises
authority over a population and territory. Being a complex of legal institutions
and procedural mechanisms, the state is not normally associated with the hot
passions surrounding an emotional attachment to a nation. Nonetheless, both the
identity and the institutional culture of the state have come under close scrutiny.
The resulting studies fall into several categories, beginning with broad investigations
of the features that distinguish the state from its functionally similar subcomponents,
such as the states in federal systems or provinces and administrative units in unitary
states. One such feature is sovereignty: the claim to final authority over a population
and territory. Considerable information has been compiled on the actual capacity of
the state to control what takes place in its jurisdiction, especially in light of increasing
traffic across borders; the formal, legal indefeasibility of this jurisdiction, especially by
outsiders; the evolution of the state’s responsibilities; and the different ways in which
it has been connected to its own society and to other states.
Sovereignty, it seems, is being eroded throughout the world. One sign of this is its
unprecedented pooling in the European Union. Another is the growing number of
failed states, in which sovereignty has disappeared entirely. Yet another is the
international community’s increasing interventions for humanitarian purposes.
Perhaps the most widely perceived evidence of sovereignty’s decline is the state’s
 Hans Kohn’s work is the exception. See
his Nationalism: Its Meaning and History
(Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, ).
 For a critique of the ways in which the
West constructed the Orient as a
negative mirror image of its own
identity, see Liah Greenfeld,
Nationalisms: Five Roads to Modernity
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, ); Yael Tamir, Liberal
Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, ); and Edward
Said, Orientalism (New York, Vintage
Books, ).
 On Japan’s search for dignity through
full participation in the international
system at the beginning of the twentieth
century, see Dorothy Jones, Code of
Peace: Ethics and Security in a World of
Warlord States (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, ), chap. .
 Primordialists propose the “sleeping
beauty” thesis, that the removal of
external constraints leads to the
awakening of dormant loyalties, while
instrumentalists suggest that this is due
to opportunistic uses of national or
ethnic identities as instruments for
mobilizing and organizing political
support.
 See Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff,
Ethnic Conflict in World Politics
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, ).
 General overviews appear in Charles
Tilly, ed., The Formation of National
States in Western Europe (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, );
and Gianfranco Poggi, The State: Its
Nature, Development, and Prospects
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, ).
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waning capacity to exercise final authority in the face of powerful global economic
forces.
The apparent transformation of sovereignty need not be seen as a cultural
phenomenon. Naturally, sovereignty pertains to the state’s capacity to control
other actors or outcomes. Sovereignty then becomes a synonym for state control.
From a legal perspective, sovereignty refers to the legal character of the state in an
international context. A leading concern of international legal scholars is the extent
to which states have ceded their legal authority to international organizations in
various areas. The culture shift that may be influencing this apparent decline in
sovereignty is best understood by examining the constructivist literature.
The institution of sovereignty, constructivists argue, is not disappearing; it is merely
being redefined. It remains a basic aspect of the state’s identity, not merely its legal
status. This has been the case since , when the Peace of Westphalia established
a culture of non-intervention among the European society of states along with the
associated paraphernalia that have come to constitute the basics of regular diplomatic
intercourse still in use today. Each state became supreme in its own realm and only in
its own realm, and states agreed to no longer go to war over religion, which had
incited the bloody Thirty Years War, just concluded.
Sovereignty came into being as a relational concept, signifying how states would
perceive each other. A sovereign claim only made sense if others made similar claims,
so it became necessary to define and defend a claim to a limited territory. Sovereignty
spelled out the manner in which claimants to a final authority, beyond any superior
earthly power, would attempt to manage their mutual relations.
Constructivists looking at the contemporary context attempt to evaluate changes in
the ways states interact and in their effectiveness in exercising their final authority.
For example, weak Third World states are said to enjoy a purely jurisdictional form
of sovereignty without possessing the underlying de facto sovereignty— effective
control over a population and territory— that used to be a precondition for entering
the club of sovereigns before the era of decolonization. Others argue that the
language of sovereignty is now used primarily by powerful states to reaffirm their own
identities by projecting negative attributes onto others. In addition, the culture of
super-power mistrust that crippled the collective security mechanisms in the Charter
of the United Nations has disappeared in the aftermath of the Cold War. And a
universal culture of human rights and perhaps humanitarian responsibility appears
to be eroding the prerogative of states in matters purely within their domestic
jurisdiction.
For instrumentalists, the culture of sovereignty is only important to the extent that
states or other actors can use it effectively. Some say that states use (that is, violate or
defend) sovereignty only when it suits their interests. Furthermore, there is nothing
special about the agreement reached at Westphalia. It was a pragmatic deal, like
others reached before and after , which were effective as long as they served state
interests. In the end, states emerged and became sovereign because they exercised
control over their own people and territory. This allowed them to continue extracting
the resources they needed to wage war and survive. Being recognized as a sovereign
by other states was largely a rhetorical nicety, comparable to what makes today’s
 See Janice E. Thomson and Stephen D.
Krasner, “Global Transactions and the
Consolidation of Sovereignty,” in Global
Changes and Theoretical Challenges:
Approaches to World Politics for the s,
Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N.
Rosenau, eds. (Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, ).
 See Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia
Weber, eds., Sovereignty as Social
Construct (New York: Cambridge
University Press, ).
 Examples of scholarship that sees inter-
national law as a useful lens through
which to view world politics are found
in Thomas Franck, The Power of
Legitimacy Among Nations (New York:
Oxford University Press, ).
 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States:
Sovereignty, International Relations and
the Third World (New York: Cambridge
University Press, ).
 Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty
(New York: Cambridge University Press,
); David Campbell, Writing Security:
United States Foreign Policy and the
Politics of Identity (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, ).
 See, for example, Louis Henkin and L. J.
Hargrove, eds., Human Rights: An Agenda
for the Next Century (Washington, D.C.:
American Society of International Law,
).
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Germany and Albania sovereign equals under international law. Primordialists find
sovereignty more or less irrelevant because loyalties existed before the European state
system emerged, and if sovereign entities are to survive, they need to be in concert
with these primordial loyalties.
A second strand of research has followed the shifting functions and responsibilities
of states, the effect of which in many cases has been to link domestic and
international activities. Over the twentieth century, the state expanded its domestic
economic role, and welfare became a prominent concern. The state therefore took
on the responsibility of both ensuring economic growth and redistributing wealth.
In its international dealings, the state promoted trade and expanded the institutions
needed to facilitate it. As a result, it gained a new identity, the “trading state,”
alongside the older identity of the “warrior state.” Recognizing the importance of
maintaining balanced economic growth at home, the advanced industrialized
countries thought it would be prudent to plan at least loosely how they would
adjust to perturbations in international trade and finance. They agreed to embrace
liberalism and economic openness but to share the costs of adjustment so that these
would not fall disproportionately on any one country or any one segment of
society. John Ruggie, who developed this notion of “embedded liberalism,” now
believes that the compromise is unraveling. This is not because of the resurgence of
nationalist protectionism, as was widely feared, but because groups within societies
are less willing to share the costs of adjustment.
The overriding point is that states can forge a new identity when the functions they
perform undergo a marked change. To what extent such changes in function are a
response to international and social pressures or to new cultures of expertise among
state leaders and policy-makers is uncertain. Overlooking important nuances, one can
say the question boils down to whether a state’s identity is a product of the changing
bureaucratic and leadership cultures that inform its functions, or whether it is a less
plastic entity—marked by political independence and territorial integrity— that is
unaffected by changes in state function due to socioeconomic pressures.
Scholars have long been interested in yet another feature of the state: its association
with the exercise of citizenship. To participate in deliberations that would set the course
of the state was, in Aristotle’s view, the highest of human endeavors. A growing concern
among many countries today is a decline in the quality of citizenship and public
participation. Migration and transnational economic trends make it difficult for
individuals to participate in public affairs and thereby exercise greater control over their
lives. To complicate matters, industrial and technological interests appear to be
undermining the capacity of average citizens to participate in collective decision-
making, most notably on questions of security. As a result, say some commentators, a
new kind of state is evolving: a national security state, which is imbued with a culture
of secrecy, is dominated by experts, and is subservient to a hierarchy that impedes
democracy at home and promotes mistrust abroad. Similar criticisms have long been
leveled against militarism, whether it was thought to be sparked by the greed of arms-
makers or by warrior cultures rooted in aristocracies of the past.
 Stephen Krasner, “Westphalia and All
That,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy,
Goldstein and Keohane, eds., pp. –.
 See Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the
Trading State: Conquest and Commerce
in the Modern World (New York: Basic
Books, ). Related to this theme is
the proposition that democracies do not
go to war against each other. As this
theme is largely seen as a political and
economic constraint on conflict among
states, it was not emphasized in this
essay. Nonetheless, there is occasionally
a cultural component to arguments
regarding the democratic peace thesis.
See, for example, Bruce M. Russett et
al., Grasping the Democratic Peace:
Principles for a Post-Cold War World
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, ).
 See John G. Ruggie, “International
Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar
Economic Order,” International Organi-
zation : (Spring ), pp. –;
and Winning the Peace (New York:
Columbia University Press, ).
 See Saskia Sassen, Losing Control?
Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization
(New York: Columbia University Press,
); and United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development
(UNRISD), Globalization and
Citizenship: A Report of the UNRISD
International Conference, Geneva, –
December  (Geneva: UNRISD,
September ).
 Recent attempts to place militarism in
context include Robert Latham, The
Liberal Moment: Modernity, Security,
and the Making of Postwar International
Order (New York: Columbia University
Press, ). On aristocratic warrior
cultures, see Joseph Schumpeter,
Imperialism and Social Class (New York:
A. M. Kelly, ).
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COMPETING IDENTITIES
As should be clear by now, states do not coincide perfectly with nations.
Furthermore, many other kinds of social identities exist, often in competition with
nations and states. At times, this competition forces states and nations to adapt and
remain flexible and thus helps sustain them. At other times, competing identities
displace the state by impeding state functions or making nations less distinctive or
cohesive. The light in which these competing identities are viewed depends more or
less on whether one considers states and nations to be “normal” identities, which
have usually been seen as the main actors in world politics.
Of course, other actors have made their presence felt on the international stage as
well. Commercial enterprises, for one, have exercised power in international affairs,
dating back to the time when merchants first traversed unknown terrains and
contacted unfamiliar societies, in search of fortune and adventure. But the enduring
economic growth that the world has become accustomed to is a relatively new
phenomenon in human history, fueled perhaps by particular cultural forces, as
suggested in Max Weber’s well-known thesis. The Protestant ethic, he argued,
encouraged people to accumulate wealth during their time on earth, and this gave
rise to capitalism and economic growth. Whether capitalism is linked to a specific
cultural identity remains a subject of heated debate, especially since many non-
Protestant societies have successfully instituted capitalist economies. One of the
most widely accepted ideas along the lines of the cultural thesis was formulated by
Joseph Schumpeter, who suggested that it is the entrepreneurial culture of a stable
middle class that precipitates the kind of sustained risk-taking investment needed
for continual economic growth.
Since the end of World War II, one manifestation of that entrepreneurial spirit has
been the growing power of multinational corporations, which are now said to be
eroding the sovereignty of states. Transnational business interests have become
particularly powerful in developing countries, especially those willing to trade some
of their control in exchange for the investments and new technologies multinational
corporations can bring. In addition, with the protectionist mode of industrialization
rapidly giving way to liberalizing export-led strategies, the economic philosophy
underlying multilateral economic institutions and being taught in the economics
departments of Western universities and business schools is triumphing over the
alternatives. Some observers now see a universal business culture taking hold, in
which private firms are exercising a form of private authority over many aspects of
global commerce. Others maintain that certain cultural identities— those that are
highly kin-focused and suspicious of associations with strangers—are resisting the
openness, transparency, and public-spiritedness that allow a liberal capitalist political
economy to thrive.
Despite the importance of global economic trends and their impact on various
cultures, few would agree that cultural identity is primarily a product of economic
forces. This view has gained ascendancy with the decline in Marxist explanations of
identity, which are anchored in a person’s or group’s relation to the economic mode
of production, whether they are aware of it or not. Although wholesale economic
determinism, Marxist or not, has fallen out of favor, most analysts today attribute at
least some degree of identity to an actor’s economic position.
 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott
Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Son’s, ).
 There is a vast literature on the condi-
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accompanied it. The various factors that
led Europe’s economic take-off are
discussed in E. L. Jones, The European
Miracle (New York: Cambridge
University Press, ).
 See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism ,
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George Allen and Unwin, ).
 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay:
The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enter-
prises (New York: Basic Books, ).
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Cambridge University Press, ).
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Economic Order,” in Governance without
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Czempiel, eds. (New York: Cambridge
University Press, ).
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International Risk (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, ).
 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy
Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
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Aside from business, another prominent actor in international affairs is the non-
governmental organization. These nonprofit organizations are multiplying in
response to the triumph of liberalism and the spread of new technologies and
infrastructures. Their activities are said to be making a key contribution to building
vibrant civil societies; aggregating, organizing, and articulating citizens’ interests;
providing a locus for self-governing deliberations among citizens; gathering important
social knowledge; and delivering social services. Non-governmental organizations also
span international borders. Their unique culture is said to be spawning a transnational
civil society. Although non-governmental organizations vary greatly in size,
function, and age, they do seem to share a culture that is fiercely independent,
flexible, and impatient with hierarchy. The extent to which non-governmental
organizations are directly challenging the state, by assuming some of its functions or
providing a full-fledged alternative, is another matter of lively debate. The state is,
however, clearly the focus of much of their attention, in that non-governmental
organizations often apply pressure to states, implement state-funded policies, or
deliver services that are not forthcoming from the state or the market.
The state is also what gives non-governmental organizations legitimacy and
protection under its laws and regulations. Human rights non-governmental
organizations, which have assumed the role of humanity’s conscience in monitoring
and reporting human rights violations and protecting victims of abuse, draw their
license from international legal covenants to which states have bound themselves.
And environmental non-governmental organizations have assumed an even more
formalized role in environmental treaties, the enforcement of which nonetheless
remains largely in the hands of states.
One of the missions of international organizations and the underlying body of
international law has been to build a transnational culture dedicated to the rule of
law. Non-governmental organizations and labor organizations have been particularly
active in this regard in the twentieth century’s movement toward multilateralism.
They have sought to put a stop to both military and economic warfare, because the
disadvantaged working class normally pays the highest price for state conflicts. They
have also sought to end the prerogative of each sovereign to wage war or to engage in
other actions that can damage the human community. In international law, war is
now illegal, and force is sanctioned only when necessary for self-defense or when
given multilateral authorization. What remains uncertain, however, is to what extent
international law is effective in shaping state behavior, and to what extent
international law is used by states as a rhetorical device to adorn their interests.
Whichever case is more convincing, it is undeniable that the United Nations is now
home to a culture that respects the rule of law, and most states obey international
rules and norms most of the time.
According to some scholars, the rules and procedures established by the tradition of
international law have paved the way for the spread of international regimes by
regulating issues ranging from fisheries to central bank settlements to the proliferation
of nuclear technology. The implication is that a culture of rule-based cooperation,
treating international relations as a positive-sum game, wherein one side’s gain does
not come at the expense of another side’s loss, has socialized or softened the hard edge
of sovereignty. Though it is difficult to evaluate the consequences, there is strong
evidence that states have become embedded in networks of international
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Overview (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
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organizations, making state behavior ever more anchored in a culture of international
organization and law. Still, a great deal of skepticism surrounds the effectiveness of
law in fostering multilateral cooperation, especially when security is at stake.
Since states and nations both imply territorial boundaries, their identities appear to
be fixed in space. However, the movement of masses of people across the boundaries
of states and nations has added a new dimension to this concept. Diasporas, migrants,
and refugees who become disassociated from their homelands and who mix with
other cultures bring about vast changes to nations and states, both through the
stresses they create and the contributions they make. Though an international regime
was created to deal with the refugees from World War II, the identities of nations and
states continue to be destabilized by the refugee migration and internal displacement
caused by the violent conflict.
Migration is far from a new phenomenon; what is new is the idea of a fixed
association between a group of people and a territory, which took hold only in the
past few centuries with the establishment of nation-states. Moreover, the capacity
for communication and travel across long distances is making it easier for migrants to
preserve their original cultures and resist assimilation by their host cultures. This is
said to be transforming the exercise of citizenship, which has conventionally been
interpreted as the full rights of participation conditional on exclusive allegiance to the
state in which one resides. Where migrant populations without the full rights of
citizenship have flooded host countries and where diasporas maintain allegiances to
their country of origin, politics are bound to be affected; the position of those who
are not accepted as full citizens may even be put in jeopardy. Some also see diasporic
identities, with their competing allegiances to foreign peoples and places, as a threat
to the coherence of states, in that they make it more difficult to articulate a “national
interest.”
Movement and home country connections across borders make the boundaries
of states and nations more nebulous. They can also have an adverse impact on
indigenous peoples with close ties to the land, especially tribal populations. Their
security has become an issue of international concern, as indigenous peoples normally
reside in states dominated by alien cultures. Their ways of life are particularly
vulnerable to the incursion of modern social forces, and efforts are being made to
secure special protection for these peoples. They are different from conventional
minorities whose cultural identity is relatively secure but who need to be protected
from the political tyranny of the majority. In contrast, indigenous cultures are at risk
because their identity is being overtaken by the culture that surrounds them. They
require explicit, formal recognition as a coherent and separate society. In addition,
they require formal guarantees that their characteristic way of life will be respected
by the state that continues to represent them at the international level.
Religion is another identity that crosses the territorial bounds of any one state or
nation. It, too, has returned to prominence in the international arena, through its
impact on people’s loyalties. This trend parallels the recent revival of nationalism
and, like it, was mistakenly thought to be losing strength as a cultural force in the face
of modernization. Despite its strong influence on human behavior and perceptions of
the world, religion is seldom considered the primary identity of major actors in the
international arena. Though religious leaders are often prominent players, entire
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religions rarely have the kind of organizational cohesion that would qualify them as
actors. Nonetheless, religion is often seen as a deeply held culture that not only
defines people’s view of themselves in relation to the universe but also puts moral
constraints on states and nations.
There are still other identities competing with established nations and states.
Criminal syndicates, terrorists, and revolutionaries all seek either to evade or supplant
state authority. These and a host of other social groups in the world cohere across the
international landscape through their cultural connections. An examination of the
concept of culture itself, especially its relation to nature and to gender, follows.
COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES AND NATURE
Social collective identity is said to spring in part from sharing a common
relationship with nature, which makes people feel that they are part of a coherent
“whole.” The simplest forms of social organization, such as tribes, develop cultures
directly related to their experience of and beliefs about nature. However, the
culture-nature connection may play a role even in modern societies, for example,
in their national parks, natural “monuments” celebrated in anthems and national
folklore, legends of conquering the wilderness, and general pride in the special
beauty or other significance of the parcel of planetary nature that is encompassed
by one’s nation. Research on the ties between nature and nation has emerged as an
interesting interdisciplinary trend, linking natural history, the history of science,
ecology, and the humanities. Going beyond the state’s legal claim to territory and
the nation’s political claim to land, this research tries to decipher the underlying
cultural attitudes toward nature that make attachments to land and claims to
territory so important. Its findings are gaining the attention of security scholars.
One proposition of particular interest is that the concept of the state in relation to
nature is undergoing a profound change: the state, once considered the embodiment
of an ethic that sees nature as a repository of resources to be exploited for the sake of
social improvements, is being reshaped by an array of social movements that view
nature in different ways. Some see nature as the common heritage of a collective
identity, occasionally humanity itself, or as a wondrous presence that is being
despoiled by human hubris, for some, epitomized by the modernizing state. These
and other concerns are now a recurring theme in global policy thinking, fortified in
part by the spread of a “green” culture. Although states still appear to play the leading
role in addressing global environmental issues, their policy decisions are often made
in response to pressures from non-governmental organizations and social
movements. All this attention to nature may be fostering a global awareness of the
value and vulnerability of nature, a culture that has already been dubbed “Earth
Nationalism.”
GENDER
With more and more women entering the monetized workforce and assuming
positions of public leadership, it seems inevitable that they should be given increasing
attention in public policy. Security is one area in which this trend has not been
evident. Some would say that this exclusion of women and women’s concerns is
anchoring knowledge about security in a confrontational culture, and that a culture
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of male power is dominating studies of international relations. All the attention is said
to be on the powerful few, while the important role that the powerless many play in
structuring social life is being neglected. Others consider gender an important factor
in the formation of basic political institutions or in sustaining various organizational
cultures. The recent literature mostly complains that gender has been neglected as an
identity and that a better understanding of it should help societies build more
inclusive or less confrontational security identities.
Whatever identity is being studied, it is important to remember that no identity exists
by and for itself. Even if identity is simply being used to distinguish among the items
in a class of objects, the classification will always be based on some relation among
the objects. More important, humans and their groups forge and maintain identities
through contact with “others,” be they human or not. The next question to ask is:
How do all these relations affect what actors seek to do?
 For the notion that the canon of
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world view rooted in the experiences of
a minority of men, see J. Ann Tickner,
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III.  CULTURE AND INTERESTS
Culture is clearly not the only factor behind the interests that actors pursue. Even
when it does play a role, it may do so only under certain conditions, but these
conditions themselves may evolve over time as culture exerts its influence or itself
undergoes change. As in the case of identities, many discussions of these topics
cannot escape asking how to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of human
affairs, when and how social science should be done, and which theoretical tradition
should be followed in pursuing useful knowledge.
Leaving aside arguments about the validity of knowledge claims, one can say that
culture affects interests, in basically two ways: it can regulate interests, or it can
constitute them. When culture regulates interests, it operates in much the same
way as the rules of a game, dictating what moves can and cannot be made, what
tactics can and cannot be followed. Its effect is also similar to the way in which the
calculation of costs and benefits directs economic behavior in a market. In the case
of culture, however, the costs and benefits are based on norms and principles that
an actor relies on in deciding what should and should not be done. For example,
human rights norms are said to prevent governments from abusing their own
citizenry even when such abuse would help governments eliminate political
opponents. Or transnational cultural taboos are said to have prevented arms
manufacturers from producing exploding bullets in the nineteenth century or the
major powers from using chemical weapons since World War I. Thus cultural
instructions push an actor in certain directions, even when the actor would benefit
by not following these instructions.
The arguments in support of the regulative function of culture are most convincing
when no coercive sanctions are present to enforce the rules. For example, one
generally does not commit a major crime, because the state would in all likelihood
enforce the law and impose a penalty. At the same time, able-bodied individuals may
have many opportunities to rob frail elderly people with impunity but avoid doing so
because of the widely shared belief that it would be wrong, even though one could
escape punishment. Cultural effects are considered important in these cases because
they work independently without requiring a mechanism to coerce enforcement.
In short, there are certain things one just does or refuses to do because of culture.
Even when coercion is necessary, culture can make the sanctions work more
smoothly. When culture exerts some of the pressure that keeps actors in line, it
lightens the burden on the sanctioning agent. Furthermore, culture can legitimize
enforcement, thereby reducing resistance to it, and making it less costly.
As mentioned earlier, culture is also said to define or constitute interests. It does so
by delineating what is worth pursuing and what must be avoided. Again, the game
metaphor is apt. The rules of a game do not simply tell a player what kinds of moves
can and cannot be made, they indicate what the game is about; they reveal its purpose
and objectives, and how a player is expected to behave. When states seek recognition
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from other states that make up the international community, they are not just
responding to appropriate cues from the international culture of law and diplomacy
to gain for themselves the benefits of full-fledged sovereignty. Receiving recognition is
also an end in itself. As in joining a club, attaining the status of membership is as
important, and perhaps even more important, than gaining access to the amenities of
the clubhouse.
The regulative effects of culture can be discerned from the manner and circumstances
in which actors use culture to pursue their interests. Particularly close attention will
therefore be given to cultures that are considered malleable enough to be adjusted to
suit various interests. When states have common interests they want to pursue, but
find it difficult to proceed in the absence of a central enforcement mechanism in the
international realm, they often create institutions and norms to help them adjust their
interactions. Though these are rarely called “cultural” institutions, the fact remains
that they are used to manage the perceptions and expectations of actors, without
changing the underlying interests of actors. They affect how actors believe others will
act and how their own behavior will affect the behavior of others:
At the end of the day, success in the negotiation stage of regime formation
occurs when parties find a mutually comprehensible language with which to
communicate about the launching of a common project, however we as
analysts choose to describe the nature of the underlying problem that
stimulates the parties to act.
Actors do not form regimes with a view to crafting a common language or a common
culture. The culture that emerges is a tool actors use in pursuing the substantive goals
they share, which is what actually brought them to the negotiating table.
In the rapidly growing literature on how institutions, norms, and shared understandings
prove useful for international actors, these normative tools are said to complement
the other regulative implements actors use in crafting cooperative arrangements in the
international realm. This is the case whether regimes and international institutions
were erected by dominant powers with the means to sanction non-compliance or
whether they emerged through a more decentralized process. In transnational
cooperation and governance, cultural elements such as norms and principles serve as
mechanisms that reduce transaction costs, focus actors’ attention on their mutual
interests, or establish a common language that can help actors communicate. Yet the
extent to which cultural ideas help elucidate the institutions and processes of
international cooperation remains unsettled.
Cultures also appear to regulate interests through domestic institutions and
bureaucracies that operate internationally. The cultures that permeate military
organizations and foreign-policy bureaucracies are used to interpret the international
context and to organize and maintain the cohesiveness of these organizations. Whereas
some cultures help actors collaborate on issues of mutual interest, especially within
organizations, bureaucratic cultures also give rise to misperceptions about other actors
and organizations, occasionally leading to consequences unintended by anyone.
The complexity of international policy issues poses a great challenge for policy-
makers, who use various analytic tools to make problems more comprehensible and
tractable. These ways of understanding and responding to the international context
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become entrenched as a policy culture. The problem is that this understanding may
not be entirely objective or appropriate, in that policy-makers often to try to fit their
potential adversaries into a preconceived mold. This can lead to either inappropriately
aggressive or misguided conciliatory strategies. Bureaucracies, too, rely on certain
operational cultures in their decision-making. These are usually ones that have proved
successful in previous contexts. They often prove, however, less useful and
occasionally disastrous in newly emerging contexts.
On the other hand, organizations do become aware of the problems of a mismatch
between their culture and that of the clients they serve. The World Bank, for one, is
attempting to devise economic development strategies that are more compatible with
indigenous cultures: “Even development programmes which are environmentally or
economically sound are likely to stumble and eventually crumble, if they are not also
socially and culturally robust and enduring.” Note that the purpose of becoming
more culturally sensitive is to design and implement better projects and policies for
economic growth and development. Culture remains a regulative tool.
The limits and possibilities of cultures as regulative tools in international cooperation
and policy-making is now the subject of a growing body of research. One of the
central tenets of this work is that policy cultures can change through learning. They
can adapt to changing circumstances, as people who participate in them compare
their cultural beliefs to what is taking place in the world, and as they acquire new
ideas and knowledge. Indeed, ideas and knowledge are considered the crucial factors
guiding actors whose job it is to negotiate and coordinate policies and define
common problems. State leaders are said to arrive at their decisions by using as a
guide the “lessons” they draw from analogous experiences in the past. The United
States and Soviet Union, for instance, decided on the basis of their confrontations
earlier in the Cold War to build security regimes, and the Soviet elites, having learned
about the limits of their policy culture, decided to engage in the “New Thinking” of
the Gorbachev era.
As actors attempt to alter the regulative culture they employ in pursuing their
interests, they rely on new ideas and knowledge to change or supplant their existing
policy cultures. Scholarship in this area has undergone an explosion recently, with
scholars studying the effects of ideas on foreign policy and the role of “epistemic
communities” in creating expertise-based consensual knowledge about certain issues
areas. Ideas and knowledge are increasingly being seen as crucial factors in guiding
how actors negotiate, coordinate policies, and define common problems. The growing
importance of knowledge is clear; science itself has emerged as a transnational
expertise-based culture. For example, the capacity to provide scientific analyses of
climate change is said to have played a crucial role in getting states to agree on the
recently negotiated ozone depletion treaties.
These developments raise a very interesting question: With the rapid accumulation of
ever more sophisticated knowledge, will these changes in regulative cultures lead to
more fundamental change, beyond the manner in which actors pursue and coordinate
interests? The strong suspicion is that interests themselves may change, as the
constitutive vision of culture proposes.
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In the constitutive view, cultural change causes actor identities to change, and hence
the way actors think of themselves and their interests. Whatever the impact of the
ongoing learning in regulative cultures, culture is believed to shape interests.
Consequently, beyond serving to help or hinder actors in the pursuit of their
interests, cultures define who they are and what they pursue.
If cultural change is possible, what then of the culturally based differences among
human collectives that are again wreaking havoc on the world? Are they truly
irreconcilable? On one hand, there are those who believe cultural differences at the
level of civilizations are largely impervious to change. In the future they envision,
the major fissures in world politics will be along deep cultural lines, much larger
than those dividing states. Since the end of the Cold War, people have already
begun to reaffirm their cultural—which some take to mean largely religious or
ethnic—identity. These developments, it is said, presage a return to primordial
cultural differences. The more prevalent scholarly view, on the other hand, is that
cultural change is altering identities and redefining interests. Evidence to this effect
is drawn from various sources: the manner in which states come to common
agreement on what it means to be a “civilized” state, military cultures reshaping
attitudes toward security, or the cumulative effects of normative pressures that
make certain policies “unthinkable” while others become so entrenched that it is
difficult to imagine a world without them. The consensus among constitutive
thinkers is that “cultural-institutional contexts do not merely constrain actors by
changing the incentives that shape their behavior. They do not simply regulate
behavior. They also help to constitute the very actors whose conduct they seek to
regulate.”
As mentioned earlier, many now believe that the culture of the international
system has changed what it means to be a state by altering the interests states
pursue. Normative changes, some say, have made extinct the colonial identity
considered legitimate in the nineteenth century. The global abolition of slavery
is also attributed to normative cultural change, as is the spread of increasingly
negative attitudes toward war. These developments indicate that certain
interests previously considered integral to statehood have disappeared from the
repertoire of state policies. At the same time, changes in the culture of the
international system are creating new interests for states, such as humanitarian
intervention. The driving force here often includes normative pressures rather
than pure geopolitical interests, which were once the dominant concern in cases
of intervention. Rich and capable states have intervened in humanitarian crises
because it was the right thing to do, even though it brought little obvious benefit
to the intervening state. As also pointed out earlier, another new aspect of
modern state identity emerging under the influence of information gained from
international organizations, is science policy. Many newly independent states are
establishing science policies because they are learning from international
organizations such as UNESCO that modern statehood means having a science
policy, even though it is not clear that this brings tangible benefits to resource-
strapped developing countries.
More broadly in the constitutive vein, it has been argued that states have also
altered the cultural environment in which they operate. It has been said that the
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Keegan, A History of Warfare (New
York: Knopf, ), p. ; and John
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the Recent Transformations of World
Politics (New York: HarperCollins,
), pp. –.
  Martha Finnemore, “Constructing
Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,”
pp. –. See also Laura W. Reed and
Carl Kaysen, eds., Emerging Norms of
Justified Intervention (Cambridge, Mass.:
American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, ). On the normative
motivations for United States overseas
food aid, see Robert McElroy, Morality
and American Foreign Policy (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, ).
 See Martha Finnemore, “International
Organizations as Teachers of Norms,”
International Organization :
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international context itself is a cultural creation of states, which at times throughout
history has been filled with a competitive, war-prone spirit often referred to as
“international anarchy.” Such conditions are not simply due to the fact that no
central government is in operation in the international community; the customs
and habits of interacting in this decentralized environment are the results of a
culture created by states. States made this system, and they can change it.
Moreover, they have indeed collaborated on some functions that have been
described as the seeds of an international state.
Less abstractly, patterns of cooperation have been identified in security matters. Some
states are said to be building “security communities” that are generating new security
identities as well as shared norms of appropriate behavior. These communities are
based on a sense of “we”-ness and a commitment to abstaining from violence in
solving problems within the community. Though these alliances differ as to the
degree of “we”-ness among members, they are more than pragmatic associations
designed to ward off potential threats from outside the community. In many cases,
such alliances engage the identities of the member states and thus alter their
conceptions of their interests.
A state’s security policies are also greatly influenced by its bureaucratic and military
culture. In other words, a policy-maker’s cultural environment can help to account
for choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. A case in point is
the disastrous defensive doctrine France adopted before World War II as a result
of its cultural emphasis on short-term conscription. That doctrine failed to take
into account the complex operations, and hence long-term training, needed for
mechanized warfare. Similarly, China’s realpolitik approach to grand strategy
has been deeply embedded in its military culture for much of its history. For
Germany and Japan, a culture of antimilitarism now appears to be shaping their
security identities. Military culture may also affect the ways in which states
conduct warfare or may even drive states with the same political structure into
conflict because of their different beliefs about norms of cooperation and
appropriate external behavior.
Transnational norms, especially those related to weapons and the use of force,
must also be included among elements of culture that have an impact on security.
There are taboos against the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, for instance,
shaped by “prohibitionary norms.” These norms do not simply reflect a lack of
military effectiveness or a fear of retaliation, but also the belief that the consequences
of using such weapons would be so vast and so indiscriminate that they would
exceed all standards of what is morally acceptable. Though a taboo plays a
regulative role in constraining the use of weapons, it also has a constitutive
function once it becomes internalized by policy-makers. Interestingly, it may
have unforeseen side effects as well: some have suggested that the nuclear taboo
has led to a search for alternative weapons that could have the same effect while
escaping the nuclear odium.
 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States
Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics,” International Organization :
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deterrence has not yet been adequately tamed
by these taboos: “The cold war lives on in the
minds of men who cannot let go of the fears,
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tempt the apocalypse but to prepare its way.”
General Lee Butler, “The Risk of Deterrence:
From Super Powers to Rogue Leaders,”
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Other transnational norms of interest to the global community are those that lead
away from realpolitik behaviors and identities. These include human rights norms,
the spread of which has made states de jure guarantors of universal rights for their
citizens. Furthermore, human rights norms have helped give shape to the emerging
pan-European identity.
The subject of human rights illustrates the difficulty in determining the effectiveness
of transnational norms. Norms are rarely uncontested, and there are generally
multiple norms vying for prominence and relevance. In practice this has led to
controversies over “Asian” values and charges of a Western bias in the documents and
philosophies that undergird the human rights instruments of international law.
Nonetheless, most commentators remain impressed by the global spread of human
rights and the degree to which systematic abuses are disavowed by virtually all states.
The strength of norms and principles appears not to diminish even when they are
occasionally violated. All societies have a norm against murder, and there are clear
violations of this norm. But this does not mean that the norm against murder is
ineffective or irrelevant. Similarly, in the international realm, transnational cultural
prescriptions and prohibitions are occasionally violated. Yet state leaders do
seriously consider the moral implications of these violations. In deciding whether to
go to war, for example, they do worry about how they will be able to justify the use
of force. The implication is that actors who care about what others think will only
undertake activities they can justify. And it is the culture that actors share that
provides the range of what is justifiable. Thus, even when a norm against a certain
type of behavior is not enough to elicit compliance, a great deal may still depend on
how violations are justified.
In constitutive thinking, the incidence and conduct of organized violence will
depend on whether the recourse to force is justified as a means of self-defense or as
an expression of the principle “might makes right.” Over time, the cumulative effect
of arguing about what is and is not justifiable may change what actors believe is
justifiable and thus the endeavors they undertake. The central question for students
of international relations is whether these justifications can travel across cultural
divides and help uncover ways to reduce violent conflict.
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IV. CULTURES OF CONFLICT
AND COOPERATION
Whatever the media may have to say about “ancient hatreds,” it is a well-established
fact that cultural difference by itself is not a leading cause of conflict. What is not
yet fully understood, however, is how different kinds of identities may contribute to
or prevent violent conflict.
The underlying causes of conflict are obviously complex, for they are rooted in many
factors: organizational structure, political pressures, socioeconomic interests, and
certain cultural beliefs. Cultural contributors to conflict fall into two main categories:
discrimination against minorities and a collective enmity arising from past atrocities.
A related factor is “ethnic geography.” When ethnicities are intermingled rather than
clearly separated, there is a multiplicity of flashpoints and battlefields. Civilians are
more likely to become targets as belligerents seek to establish ethnically “pure” areas
that can be more readily protected and relied on for loyalty. Other causal factors—
such as economic and political transitions, elite and mass politics, or external
actors— are, however, generally thought to outweigh the importance of cultural
difference in causing conflict. One prominent exception occurs when culture is
manipulated in the mass media by leaders bent on inciting violence.
Still, even when manipulated, culture serves as a proximate rather than an underlying
cause of violence: “It is simply the raw material.” Nonetheless, cultural mistrust, if
brought into the open, may help opposing groups arrive at a long-term prevention
strategy:
Getting groups to come to terms with the distorted and pernicious aspects
of their histories and inculcating the values of compromise and tolerance in
political and social discourse are among the most important problems war-torn
countries face. In short, education is one of the keys to long-term political
stability. This is surely an area where the international community can make
a difference.
Although many remain skeptical about the theoretical and policy importance of
culture, it is a key component of a number of state activities and policies under
implementation. Indeed, cultural and scholarly exchanges, as well as overseas
broadcasts, are part of several long-standing programs administered by the U.S.
Information Agency, and military-to-military contacts through the Pentagon are
a frequent occurrence.
Furthermore, vast networks of non-governmental efforts parallel these governmental
initiatives. The mission of many non-governmental organizations is to change the
attitudes and beliefs of their beneficiaries, the governments they petition, or the
donors from whom they seek support. Their intent is to change the culture in the
field in which they operate, whether to reduce the abuse of human rights, protect
the environment, secure more aid for the world’s poorest populations, or alter some
other established practices. These efforts, governmental and non-governmental,
are arguably contributing to a decrease in mistrust and an increase in transnational
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cultural understanding. They are also said to be promoting America’s values and its
international powers of persuasion. Many of the non-governmental contacts are
called “track-two” diplomacy. They offer good offices, mediation efforts, and
channels of communication that official actors cannot exploit. Like other forms
of cultural communication, they are considered the great hope of populations
subjugated by ruling elites or caught in a web of international hostility. To this
end, various non-governmental, religious, and occasionally third-party state-based
initiatives have put great effort into establishing lines of communication among
antagonistic parties, before, during, and after conflicts. All such activities spring
from the belief that cultural exchange can have long-term consequences for world
peace and cooperation. In the words of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing
Deadly Conflict:
Those who have a deep sense of belonging to groups that cut across ethnic,
national, or sectarian lines may serve as bridges between different groups and
help to move them toward a wider, more inclusive social identity. Building
such bridges will require many people interacting across traditional barriers
on a basis of mutual respect. Developing a personal identification with people
beyond one’s primary group has never been easy. Yet broader identities are
possible, and in the next century it will be necessary to encourage them on a
larger scale than ever before.
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V. CONCLUSION
There is scant systematic evidence that cultural difference by itself is a significant
cause of organized violence. What remains to be examined is the proposition that
misunderstanding— rather than difference—among cultures is a fundamental source
of conflict. Clearly, many of the world’s loftiest hopes for the future are now pinned
on building better understanding among cultures. There is widespread excitement
over the growing body of information regarding how actors think about themselves
and one another, especially at a time when information and knowledge are being
manipulated with unprecedented dexterity; however, the sources and distribution of
the shared beliefs and values reflected in the word “culture” remain poorly understood.
In common parlance and even in some learned circles, the term is still taken to mean
ways of understanding the essential, and thus presumably unchangeable, mentalities
of certain groups of people. In this view, one must accept that these mentalities are a
permanent fact of life, and that neither those who possess these mentalities nor others
have any levers at their disposal to change them. The best course of action to ensure
scarce moments of international harmony, then, would be to determine what is
feasible, through a realistic appraisal of the underlying cultural limits on the existing
state of affairs.
But there are also those who believe that many of the obstacles standing in the way of
global security can be overcome through education and communication. They call for
appropriate policies directed at overcoming the misunderstandings that gave rise to
the obstacles in the first place, whether about the dynamics of economic markets, the
design of laws and state policy, peoples’ customary ways of dealing with the natural
environment, or the long-established mistrust and fear among different cultural
identities.
To settle such disagreements, it is not necessary to eliminate the differences. Rather, it
is essential to understand them—what they consist of and why they exist—in order
to ensure that they do not lead to violence. Perhaps a first step would be to plant the
seeds of a new culture, one that believes organized violence is not inevitable. As facile
as this may sound, it would be an enormous task. As the preceding discussion has
shown, the wheels of change can grind very slowly where cultural attitudes are
concerned. But cultural change can also, on occasion, result in sudden and
unexpected transformations.
Scholars and practitioners find that many questions about culture and identity
remain unresolved. In addition, debates about identity are hotly contested because
they raise for analysts of national security “directly and unavoidably pressing moral
issues.” Definitions of security have always referred to the protection of certain
values and ways of life. But in questioning identity and how culture may be affecting
it, one is inevitably questioning precisely how, and who should be protected. When
all is said and done, this question does not have a value-free answer.
 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Preface,” in his
The Culture of National Security, p. xiii.
